The definition of the ‘Cultural Industries’ by O'Connor, Justin
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted/accepted for pub-
lication in the following source:
O’Connor, Justin (2000) The definition of the ‘Cultural Industries’. The
European Journal of Arts Education, 2(3), pp. 15-27.
This file was downloaded from: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/43877/
c© Copyright 2000 Intellect Ltd.
Notice: Changes introduced as a result of publishing processes such as
copy-editing and formatting may not be reflected in this document. For a
definitive version of this work, please refer to the published source:
The Definition of the ‘Cultural Industries’ 
 
Justin O’Connor 
Queensland University of Technology 
 
A version of this paper was published in The European Journal of Arts Education Vol. 
2 No. 3, February 2000, pp. 15-27 Oct.  
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The definition of the cultural industries has been the subject of intense debate over the 
last few years, especially within the framework of local, national and European policy 
development. This debate has been particularly frustrating. Though there is great and 
growing interest in this subject there are currently few real theoretical or policy 
models available. European conferences on this issue are the most frustrating, where 
arguments are primarily rhetorical and definitions made incommensurable by the 
most unimaginative empiricism. This situation of course reflects deeper conflicts and 
uncertainties with the concept, indicated by the complete absence of any policy paper 
from the EC on the subject. A policy framework for the cultural industries does 
present real organisational and administrative problems, but many of these stem from 
conceptual and definitional problems, reflecting profound transformations in the role 
of ‘culture’ in contemporary economy and society. 
 
The necessary uncertainty around these transformations have made make the full 
implications of the cultural industries debate unclear; but these implications have been 
treated more in terms of rhetoric than conceptual analysis because policy debates are 
also positional struggles. This can been seen in the way in which the debate very 
quickly turns to the ‘value’ of culture – constantly shifting between economic, social 
and aesthetic understandings of ‘value’. Couching discussion around the ‘value’ or 
‘benefits’ of culture has been a major theme in the world of publicly funded arts and 
culture since the growing threat of budgetary cuts in the 1980s (though it has always 
been there). Claims as to the external benefits of culture (the cultural industries 
adding employment to the list of such benefits) have been met by equally passionate 
attacks on the attempted reduction of art and culture to their functional (in this case 
economic) value. The specific weighting and trajectory of these debates usually 
reflect the different structures, priorities and constraints faced by the subsidy systems 
in the different national/ regional formations. However, though we do not wish to 
deny the need to debate the value of art/ culture, and that the rhetorical contains many 
real political issues, we would point to the need to step back and look at the whole 
issue of the cultural industries; not as ‘a good thing’ or a ‘bad thing’ but as related to 
some fundamental transformation of economy, society and culture which we cannot 
simply dismiss or attack as if it was the work of some philistine bureaucrat wanting to 
cut the national culture budget.  
 
In this article I want to suggest ways in which the definitional debate around the 
cultural industries has to move beyond its polemical and statistical conflicts towards 
an understanding of the wider transformations in culture, economy and society of 
which it forms part. In this I will concentrate on the local and the urban context, 
stressing the role of small and micro businesses rather than the large national/ global 
corporations. At the end I suggest some pointers as to what a local cultural industry 
strategy might be. 
Cultural Industries as Policy 
 
The notion of the cultural industries has been very much driven by those involved in 
framing policy. Academic writing on the subject, with a few exceptions, has tended to 
follow Adorno and focus on the cultural and social implications of the mass 
consumption of cultural commodities. It has been ‘knowledge intermediaries’ outside 
academia working with city and other (usually arts) agencies who have promoted the 
notion. These ‘knowledge intermediaries’ include that elusive and very diverse group 
know as ‘consultants’ as well as academics working outside the standard academic 
field. 
 
This is interesting in itself, and by no means a bad thing. However, it has meant that 
‘definition’ for cities has often been understood in terms of its practical ability to 
guide planning linked to the need for statistical measurement. The numerous 
‘mapping documents’ commissioned by city authorities certainly fulfil a need to back 
up argumentation with hard fact; but this emphasis on the statistical has tended to be 
closely linked to a series of claims as to the ‘external benefits’ of art and culture 
(financial or employment related) rather than as part of a wider attempt to grasp the 
full implications and dynamics of the cultural industries as a sector. Despite the 
attempts to establish new policy models, understanding has frequently been displaced 
by arguments about statistics and the economic value of arts and culture.  
 
In the last 5 years the issue of the cultural industries has forced itself on the European 
agenda, signalled by the growing interest of DGV (Employment) in ‘cultural’ issues. 
A similar tendency can be observed at a number of European conferences organised 
on the subject – the debate quickly becomes one within the ‘arts’ constituency alone, 
with the ‘value’ of arts and culture inevitably driven towards external indicators, 
which in turn become statistical. 
 
The statistical debates around the cultural industries usually concern employment 
levels (including ‘secondary’ impacts), labour market profile, training needs and 
(increasingly) contribution to national, regional and local GDP. There have been three 
recurrent problems. Firstly, statistics in these areas tend to be collected differently in 
different countries or regions, making comparison difficult and frustrating. This is 
true of many different subject matters – but it is particularly true here where often 
there is no agreement as to whether we measure ‘artists’, or ‘tourism’, or ‘heritage’, or 
‘ancillary workers’ or ‘creatives’ or ‘reproduction’, ‘distribution’ etc. Secondly, 
employment statistics are based on outmoded industrial and occupational categories 
which make collection and analysis fraught with ambiguities and omissions, ‘cultural’ 
jobs being dispersed and buried across a range of categories. How these are grouped 
and analysed differs in each country, compounding the first set of difficulties. Thirdly, 
and following from the this last, the conceptual framework within which ‘jobs’, 
‘skills’ and ‘careers’ – the whole notion of ‘employment’ in fact – have been 
understood has undergone radical restructuring over the last decades. The way in 
which first and second jobs, non-paid jobs, unemployment and especially self-
employment have re-structured the cultural labour market make statistical analysis  
useless without real detailed investigation of the sector at a qualitative level. There 
have been some extremely useful statistical works, but in the main, and especially at 
the comparative European level, the statistical disputes around cultural sector 
employment figures has been the least illuminating, often the most absurd, and 
certainly the most tedious aspect of the debate around culture and economy. 
 
The very term cultural industries is contentious. It should be noted that the term 
industry is rather loose in the British sense – it has lost its relationship to factories and 
manufacture (though it always retained its active association with ‘industriousness’ 
which was never restricted to manufacture) and can now be applied to any set of 
activities whose product is more or less similar. Thus there is a ‘sex industry’, a ‘care 
industry’, a ‘leisure industry’ etc. The use of this description is often linked to these 
activities becoming self conscious and ‘demanding’ certain things from government 
(as when prostitutes start to organise, for example). Or it can be an ironic or 
derogatory description by politicians or journalists of activities previously hidden and 
now regularly encountered (‘the begging industry’, the ‘complaints industry’).  
 
 
The term ‘cultural industries’ was first used extensively in the UK, by the Greater 
London Council (GLC) in the 1980s, as a rhetorical or polemical device to emphasise 
two points. Firstly, that those cultural activities which fell outside the public funding 
system (the GLC sometimes equated these with mass (re)production) and operated 
commercially were important generators of wealth and employment. Secondly, a 
more directly cultural/political point – that of the whole range of cultural goods and 
objects which people consumed, the vast majority (TV, radio, film, music, books, 
adverts, concerts) had nothing at all to do with the public funding system. The GLC 
cultural strategy (one which was never fully developed) involved an economic, or 
‘alternative economic’ line concerned both to promote and to democratise cultural 
production and distribution, as well as a more ‘popular democratic’ approach to the 
funding of (popular) cultural activities (often linked to Italian models based on 
‘hegemonic’ intervention). 
 
The cultural industries thus come with economic and cultural policy baggage. After 
the abolition of the GLC the ‘cultural industries’ were taken up by other cities in the 
UK. However, the economic and cultural political aspects tended to separate. The 
latter, briefly, informed a more populist orientation of cultural policy amongst left 
leaning labour administrations in the 1980s, which largely resulted in festivals and 
event promotion rather than changes in core arts funding or strategy. It has 
increasingly found its home in tourism and city marketing strategies. The economic 
aspect was mostly used opportunistically by arts agencies or city cultural agencies 
concerned to bolster their defences against financial cuts and ideological onslaught by 
the conservative government. Using arguments largely derived from Myerscough they 
tended to accent the economic impact of the arts and cultural industries in financial 
and employment terms (and famously using ‘multipliers’ to estimate secondary 
employment effects). Only in a few areas were the wider economic implications of 
the cultural industries argument taken on board within an economic development 
context – most notably Sheffield (and Manchester and Glasgow to lesser extent).  
 
Terminological problems also reflected the difficult negotiation between the 
economic and the cultural political. The GLC tended to define cultural industries as 
those directly concerned with technological reproduction. Myerscough and Wynne 
called them the ‘arts and cultural industries’. Other studies used ‘the cultural sector’, 
including the ‘traditional arts sector’ along with commercial cultural activities. For 
others these were all the ‘cultural industries’. Recently there was an attempt to expand 
the ‘cultural industries sector’ to include related manufacture (such as electronics), 
reducing ‘original production’ (including classic cultural industries such as broadcast 
media, music recording and film) to less than 1/6th of the total sector employment. 
The Department of Culture, Media and Sport which very quickly raised the flag of the 
cultural industries now calls them the ‘creative industries’. Nobody has been able to 
provide an official  definition of the distinction between ‘cultural’ and ‘creative’ 
industries – least of all the Creative Industry Unit at the DCMS – but it seems to 
revert back to the GLC distinction of cultural industries as ‘artist centred’ and the 
creative industries as based on technological reproduction and aimed at a mass 
market. The political reasons for this are only to be guessed at, but a general sense of 
unease with ‘culture’ and a more popular (in the UK) acceptance of the word 
‘creative’ points to a working through of a more directly economic and value-laden 
agenda. Thus the DCMS can deal with this economic element – throwing in 
employment, creativity, competitiveness, innovation, exports, international branding 
etc. – whereas the Arts Council can deal more with the issue of culture as ‘the arts’, 
concerned not with economics but ‘quality’. The classic social democratic conundrum 
of ‘raise or spread’ has now passed outside the arts establishment into a wider policy 
arena.  
 
In other European countries the juxtaposition of ‘culture’ and ‘industry’ is seen as 
polemical (as it once was here), or as meaningless or contradictory. Cultural business 
or cultural enterprise is the preferred term in many European languages. However, 
‘cultural industries’ has increasingly stuck, even in other countries, in the original 
English. This seems to be for two related reasons. Firstly, the policy space opened up 
by ‘the cultural industries’ is a very real space – it refers to some large scale economic 
and cultural transformations which need to be addressed –  and the term is thus 
immediately compelling however we may eventually want to settle the precise 
definition. Secondly, the use of English indicates that this is a global policy issue, the 
term currently expressing an imperative wrought by this global economy. In short, 
whatever the definitional and linguistic difficulties, the use of ‘cultural industries’ 
itself indicates that the term is currently responding to some deep-seated and far-
reaching need to handle transformations which go beyond short term tactical polemics 
and rhetorics. 
 
At stake here is a new relationship between culture and economy. This is not the 
purely celebratory – that finally economics is valuing human creativity and realising 
individual potential– nor is it the final subsumption of culture within the productive 
base of capitalism; it is partially both but it is also a different dynamic which needs to 
be faced. In policy terms the problem has been the language difficulties between 
economics and culture. Anybody who has worked in this field has had frustrating 
encounters with the hard, master discourse of economics – not so much a refusal of 
the value of culture (they are patrons of the arts) but a refusal of its value within an 
economic discourse. Many now struggle with the increasingly central role of cultural 
value within economic production. On the other hand, the realignment of culture and 
economics directly threatens the systems of publicly funded culture established after 
WWII and set within a ‘redistributive’ (access) and ‘productive’ (no more artists in 
the garret) social democratic framework. The re-thinking this demands has too often 
been hidden by a defensive reaction to the entry of new policy players within the field 
of culture, with the subsidised culture system charged with the defence of our 
authentic cultural heritage against its commercialisation and instrumentalisation. 
 
 
Defining the Cultural Industries  
 
The cultural industries are those activities which deal primarily in symbolic goods – 
goods whose primary economic value is derived from their cultural value. We shall 
look at how this definition affects the practices and dynamics of this sector in a 
moment. This definition then includes what have been called the ‘classical’ cultural 
industries – broadcast media, film, publishing, recorded music, design, architecture, 
new media – and the ‘traditional arts’ – visual art, crafts, theatre, music theatre, 
concerts and performance, literature, museums and galleries – all those activities 
which have been eligible for public funding as ‘art’. There are certainly divisions 
between these two categories – but a line between ‘art’ and ‘commerce’ is ideological 
and not analytical. There is no way in which the classical music world, though in 
receipt of enormous public subsidy, cannot be considered deeply commercial. It 
merely responds to commerce in a particular way. Similarly, though aiming to ‘make 
it’ at some point, calling struggling pop musicians ‘commercial’ is to misunderstand a 
lot of what they do. The distribution of funds in these two area is different – one relies 
on ‘the market’, the other on a bureaucratic system of attributing value, and thus 
money. But the difference is not as fundamental as has been claimed. Both deal in 
symbolic value whose ultimate test is within a circuit of cultural value which, whether 
mediated by market or bureaucracy, relies on a wider sense of it as meaningful, 
pleasurable, beautiful etc.  
 
Those involved in contemporary cultural production increasingly move between these 
systems, though for many, they receive money from neither, relying on ‘investment’ 
from social welfare or second jobs. The key point is that we cannot start from the 
notion that these are two separate sectors divided by ‘cultural value’ versus 
‘commercial value’. We need to remember those two key points noted above – the 
commercial sector provides wealth and employment (as do the arts), but it is also a 
prime site of cultural consumption for the vast majority of the population. The role of 
‘arts’ in this configuration needs to be rethought not just ‘defended’ against the vulgar 
market. For the cultural industries have asked questions about the definition of arts 
and ‘culture’ itself. New forms of production, new understandings of ‘culture’, new 
forms of consumption and distribution have over-run the cosy seperations of ‘art’ and 
(mass or ‘folk/ethnic’) culture set up by the European state funding systems. 
 
The definition of cultural industries is by necessity fairly fluid – as products and 
activities increasingly take on aesthetic and symbolic meaning (look at gardening!) - 
which causes problems for quantitative studies. It may include advertising and even 
marketing – the question is not counting job numbers but understanding how these 
firms may fit within a local cultural dynamic. In some cities only a very few 
marketing firms could be usefully placed within the cultural sector – as actively 
responsive to changing and dynamic circuits of symbolic flow. In some cases a 
marketing or advertising firm can galvanise a section of the cultural economy. 
Similarly, new media obviously has cutting edge, culturally innovative sections, but 
separating these from general software development – from the wider information 
economy – can be difficult. Design too is difficult – the inclusion of industrial design 
really bumps up the figures but it is not clear at all how many of these are dealing 
with cultural meanings. That is, to what extent they deal in fitness for purpose in a 
functional sense, or a design awareness in an aesthetic sense (and how do we draw the 
line?). Similarly, there are very strong arguments for including cafes, bars, 
restaurants, innovative retail in this sector – but to include all such would provide 
inflated figures for the sector but no real understanding or local policy purchase. 
Indeed, the notion that we can include manufacture or related artisan/ craft skills 
within the sector also relies on a qualitative judgement that has to be made at a local/ 
regional level. Thus it seems wrong to include electronics en masse within  the figures 
in Britain when there is no evidence whatsoever of local connection or flows of 
information. The photographic, film and TV industries in the UK regions will have 
more links to Japanese, German or US firms (maybe through national intermediaries) 
than they will have to any local regional industry. On the other hand, furniture in 
Milan, ceramics in Barcelona, glass ware in Helsinki, textiles in Lyon – all would be 
able to count a large scale manufacture/ artisan basis in the cultural sector because the 
connections, the active linkages and exchanges are there.  
 
Cultural Industries and Consumption 
 
In trying to explain the rise of the cultural industries it has been usual to point to the 
growth of leisure time, education and disposable income leading to an increased 
consumption of ‘leisure’ goods and cultural goods. This is the argument that when 
basic needs have been met then ‘luxury’ goods (of which cultural goods are part) can 
then be provided. (This leads onto the boredom argument – ‘distracted from 
distraction by distraction’). A more sophisticated version of this pointed to the move 
from the mass consumption habits of the 50s/60s to the niche markets of the 70s/80s. 
The growth in demand, in other words, led not just to an expansion of the market but 
the proliferation and fragmentation of markets. This argument has been made at a 
general level in terms of the consumption driven shift from Fordism to post-Fordism – 
where companies had to radically restructure their operations in order to be able to 
detect and respond to these increasingly niched and volatile markets. Hence the 
operations of such as Beneton, with high levels of market knowledge and stock 
control, short production runs, flexible labour force etc. – coupled to a highly 
sophisticated marketing strategy. Indeed, as that marketing strategy showed, large 
areas of consumption were becoming increasingly cultural and positional. There has 
been a transformation of traditional taste cultures.  
 
Pierre Bourdieu, in Distinction, attempted to map taste cultures directly onto class, or 
class fractions, with these latter representing a differential mix of economic and 
cultural capital. He identified a new taste group/ class fraction he called the ‘new 
middle class’, a new urban service class who mixed cultural and economic capital, 
high and ‘popular’ culture in new ways. Central to this was a new concern with the 
body and a more self-conscious or ‘reflexive’ approach to identity construction 
through consumption. Since Bourdieu’s research (published in 1984 but based on 
work conducted in the late 60s/early 70s) this line of argument has become central to 
the sociology of consumption and to market research. The role of consumption in the 
construction of identity has fragmented taste groups beyond any direct connection to 
class and class fractions, undermined the central opposition of high and low cultures, 
and has made the cultural field volatile and fast-moving. Material consumption has 
become increasingly cultural, central to the construction of meaning and identity. This 
‘reflexive’ consumption has also been termed the ‘aesthetisisation of everyday life’.   
 
The growth in cultural consumption meant not just increased purchase of cultural 
goods but new uses of these goods in the construction of individual and social 
identity. These new forms of consumption - fast moving, highly segmented, 
increasingly cultural - have placed the cultural component of many consumer goods at 
the forefront of their economic value. The design input of manufactured goods, as 
well as financial and other services, has become increasingly important. This extends 
beyond design industries – where traditional artisan skills and business knowledge has 
now to be linked to ever faster and ever more volatile circuits of cultural value – to 
electronics, computing, and other equipment used within the cultural valuation 
process. 
 
We could also make a further point about what Bernice Martin has called the 
‘expressive revolution’. What we now consider to be cultural creativity and 
innovation was actually a term restricted to bohemia and the avant-garde. The 
emphasis on ‘creativity’ these days presents itself as an adoption of an ‘artistic’ 
sensibility. But it could be argued that this particular account of the artist is a 
modernist and romantic account – concerned not with the creation of harmony or the 
re-interpretation of classical models but the breaking of such models and accepted 
order at all costs. In order to do this the artist relies on her own personality, the depths 
of her own genius as the material basis of this transcendence. The notion of personal 
expressivity, of the breaking of rules, of the explicit rejection of the established social 
and artistic order were central components of the 1960s counter culture. Through this 
they entered the mainstream. This personal creativity and responsibility for the 
construction of self could be seen as part of that same process of the reflexive 
construction of identity noted above. Innovation, continual transformation, personal 
choice, creativity – all these were cultural values which in the 1970s and 80s ran close 
to the transformation of cultural consumption and, increasingly, cultural production. 
 
These are large scale transformations for which I cannot do more than trace general 
lines here. What I want to point to is that the emergence of the cultural industries was 
part of this shift, a response to it, an active negotiation. In terms of the local level we 
could call it ‘cultural renegotiation as business’. In Distinction Bourdieu identified 
what he called ‘cultural intermediaries’, the ‘organic intellectuals’ of the new middle 
class. These were the ones who opened up new cultural consumption fields, usually 
through their (post-68) control of the mass media. In the local city context these have 
been identified by writers such as Sharon Zukin as key agents of gentrification – not 
so much in the fact that they move into an area (pushing older residents out through 
rent/ price rises) but by their ability to transform the symbolic and spatial practice of 
an area. They transformed local consumption within an area (café bars, restaurants, 
delicatessens, specialist shops, galleries etc.) and changed consumption of an area 
(loft living, historic restoration, valuing ‘character’ -  the old industrial vernacular as 
yuppie landscape etc.). These cultural intermediaries, for Zukin, opened up a new 
field of consumption within the city. It was this group that, according to her, was 
directly annexed by a new wave of urban redevelopers from the mid-70s onward. 
 
I have criticised Zukin elsewhere. However, if cultural intermediaries are those 
concerned to open up local space to new practices, to transform local cultures, to act 
as agents of cultural change – then this can be conceived in a number of (positive and 
negative) ways. But from our point of view here, many of these cultural 
intermediaries have emerged in cities across Europe as entrepreneurs (though often 
not very successful), cultural catalysts who actively transform the local cultural 
landscape of the city – galleries, bands, record companies, labels, bars, artists, 
restaurants, clubs, performances, independent marketing, flyers, designers, 
independent retail, fixers, chancers, new media people. It is in this sense that many of 
the first linkages between cultural industries and local policy makers was around 
urban regeneration projects – though (as Zukin has shown) this is itself fraught with 
difficulties.  
 
Local and Global 
 
This shift towards cultural consumption is of course related to a more general process 
whereby knowledge and information have become increasingly central to the mode of 
production. This is what Manuel Castells has called the informational mode of 
production. The key elements here concern the systematic application of knowledge 
and information to the production of knowledge and information itself. This mode of 
production relies on global networks made possible by information and 
communication technologies. These global networks and infrastructures enable the 
vast and unstable flows of people, goods, finance and services which characterise this 
new mode of production. Three things concern us here. Firstly, as Castells notes, the 
increased reliance on the flow of knowledge and information across networks 
increases the specifically cultural component of these networks. By this he means 
social structures, traditions, levels of education etc. Secondly, it is the ability of local 
economies to ‘process knowledge and manipulate symbols’ that counts in this new 
economy – it is in this sense that Castells refers to local cultural structures and local 
cultural competencies. Thirdly, as Lash and Urry pointed out, these global flows are 
also increasingly made up of signs, images, texts, designs, sounds which have a 
primarily aesthetic significance. In this context it is cultural intermediaries who must 
link the global flows to a specifically local component, thus making cultural 
infrastructures a crucial element of local city planing. 
 
This local level is crucial in the debates around the cultural industries. Much of the 
European debate is focused on the level of the member states. But in terms of the 
internal dynamic of the sector it is to the local city or city-region to which we should 
look. Castells’ contention that the global economy has given increased importance to 
the city/regional level at the expense of the nation state is certainly true of the cultural 
industries. These industries have a strong and self-conscious local character. When 
they refer to the ‘national level’ they usually mean the capital city acting as a global 
node. This is the case in London, a major global node, which stands ambiguously 
between the ‘national’ (as interface between local and global) and the ‘local’ (a 
particular city-region with its own structures and dynamics etc). 
 
Defining the local sector is very difficult – especially when it comes to local GDP or 
market ‘catchment’ – because the cultural sector is an articulation of the global and 
the local. It is also an articulation of the large and the small. The cultural industries 
are predominantly made up of small businesses. In the UK 56% of those with a main 
job in the cultural sector are employed in firms of under 25 people. In this sector 25 is 
a large business. 40% are in fact self-employed. Self-employment has grown 81% in 
the 1980s compared to 53% in the economy as a whole. The younger the age group, 
the higher the percentage. In the cities of Europe these ‘new independents’ (Charles 
Leadbetter), these new cultural entrepreneurs operate as loose, fluid, highly creative 
clusters operating outside or on the edge of the public funding structures. These 
clusters are articulated to locally situated global businesses (the large broadcasting or 
film companies, for example), to global corporate distribution networks (such as 
music recording), and to the more open markets made possible by the internet and e-
commerce.  
 
This articulation of the global and the local, the ‘space of flows’ and the ‘space of 
place’ as Castells has it (discussed elsewhere in this issue) is complex and volatile. It 
has a specific mix in each locality and within each sub-sector. Thus the local 
dimension of recorded music is both more and less local than, say, a local TV. Its 
products and producers tend to be more rooted in a sense of locality, and indeed, 
become emblematic of this locality (sometimes against their wishes and after they 
have left!) than a local TV station. On the other hand the infrastructure which would 
allow the retention of economic benefit and of enhanced music business expertise is 
difficult to retain at the local level (especially in the UK); a local TV company can 
spawn a real local cluster. Understanding how this articulation operates in a specific 
locality is crucial to developing a local strategy. 
 
 
Creativity and Risk 
 
The cultural industries sector at the local level is crucially dependent on these cultural 
entrepreneurs. It in this field that the accommodations between culture and economics 
are worked out on a day to day basis. 
 
‘So you are aware just through lifestyle that you can separate yourself… Its a 
constant process of renewal and essentially, its a cliché, you’re only as good as your 
last promotion…It’s very fickle, its very liquid, it moves on. If you rest on your laurels 
and don’t progress and slightly stay ahead [you’re in trouble]. You have to be 
obsessed about what’s going on everywhere and be original and leading.’ 
 
The cultural sector mixes money and value, making money and making sense. They 
have an emotional investment in the product and a need/desire to sell it. This involves 
an insider’s knowledge of the cultural circuit and market opportunity, often couched 
in terms of ‘intuition’, ‘hunch’, ‘feeling’ and thus difficult to codify or express in 
straight business terms. They also have to manage the business, managerial, 
administrative elements of this cultural production. That is they deal in a mixture of 
symbolic and cognitive knowledge. 
 
It is here that we see the cutting edge nature of these cultural businesses. The use of 
the term ‘creative industry’ and the association of these businesses with a ‘creativity’ 
which is somehow to be spread or encouraged in other ‘straight businesses’ is 
somewhat misleading. ‘Creativity’ can be applied to a range of other businesses, 
services, activities which have nothing to do with culture or symbolic knowledge. A 
new production system, a new aeroplane design, a new city cleaning service can all be 
‘creative’. Obviously the need for lateral thinking, going back to basics, thinking the 
unthinkable etc. are often associated with ‘artistic’ practice - though this is mostly a 
particular avant-garde or modernist image of the ‘radical artist’.  
 
However, where the cultural sector leads is in the risks they have to take with the 
development of a new product. In this sector economic value is dependent on cultural 
value. The new product is based on a symbolic knowledge often expressed as 
intuition - it can’t be fully demonstrated or codified. The product will only have value 
in the future, if it takes its place in a future cultural field. As such this intuitive 
symbolic knowledge is very risky; it demands a commitment derived from a belief in 
ones self and ones hunch or vision (another linkage to radical art practice). It is 
gambling on the future value of a product in a very volatile and fast moving symbolic 
circuit. It is sticking your neck out and riding on self-belief.  
 
This is the habitus of the cultural producers, and it is sustained by a cultural capital 
acquired in education and through the informal networks and circuits of the cultural 
field. It is in this sense that the cultural sector is cutting edge - in dealing with 
symbolic value in a risky, volatile and future orientated market this sector leads the 
way for others. This new ‘network economy’ is described at its most intense by Kevin 
Kelly of Wired and it fits well the way in which cultural production takes place. 
 
‘The new rules governing this global restructuring revolve around several axes. First, 
wealth in this new regime flows directly from innovation, not optimisation; that is, 
wealth is not gained by perfecting the known, but by imperfectly seizing the unknown. 
Second, the ideal environment for cultivating the unknown is to nurture the supreme 
agility and nimbleness of networks. Third, the domestication of the unknown 
inevitably means abandoning the highly successful known - undoing the perfected. 
And last , in the thickening web of the Network Economy, the cycle of “find, nurture 
and destroy” happens faster and more intensely than ever before’. 
 
These cultural producers tend to be linked to the market not exclusively through 
research but also through intuition and market identification - they respond to larger 
shifts in lifestyle and the construction of identity through consumption. They link in 
their habitus, their business practices, their cultural capital that coming together of 
culture and economic production which we saw above. 
 
The question faced by these small businesses and self-employed is how to manage 
cultural knowledge, which underpins its ability to innovate and change, with the 
business skills necessary to keep the cash flow, negotiate new contracts, identify new 
distribution, take care or marketing the product etc. Learning how to mange these 
demands is crucial to the survival of a small business. This problem is faced by the 
large cultural industry businesses. They are concerned with the identification and 
management of talent in a way that makes a profit. Their operations are in effect, as 
Simon Frith puts it, about ‘how to rationalise the irrational’. Hence, in the music 
industry, the role of A&R, cultural intermediaries with knowledge of the local scene, 
are linked (and often opposed) to the increasingly sophisticated market analyses and 
tracking techniques. 
 
These local clusters are highly networked – it is through networks that these 
businesses begin to learn both the cultural and the cognitive ropes. The resemblance 
of these local cultural networks to Castells’ ‘milieu of innovation’ as well as the 
practical support offered by these networks will be discussed in a forthcoming book. 
However, we also need to be aware of how these tendencies intersect with the larger 
national and global industries. On the one hand there is evidence suggesting that these 
larger concerns are themselves vertically disintegrating, using flexible contracts and 
out-sourcing. On the other, horizontal integration and concentration of distribution is 
now growing. These latter have certainly been concerns of national and EC cultural 
policy makers in many European countries, especially France and to some extent 
Germany. The problem has been not that these issues have been linked to language 
protectionism (which I don’t discuss here) but that they have been uncritically linked 
to the ‘art versus commerce’ debate and that they have consistently failed to address 
the question of local and regional cultural industries. This latter dimension is 
increasingly crucial for all the reasons set out above. 
 
A New Cultural Policy 
 
This is not an attempt to dismiss the debate about culture that the rise of the cultural 
industries has provoked. I wanted to suggest that we step back and look at what is 
happening beneath our feet before jumping in. When we hear the word cultural 
industries we should not automatically reach for our Adorno. I would suggest that it 
calls both for a new understanding of the relationship between culture and economics; 
but also a new conceptualisation of cultural policy. This is a task of real urgency on 
the part of the EU, but also of city governments across Europe. I would suggest 6 
areas in which such policy development should focus.  
 
 
Recognition: the sector needs to be recognised as such – not just in terms of the 
big, ‘national’ companies (film, TV, recorded music etc.) but of the diversity, 
energy and creativity of the local clusters. It is here that policy should be focused. 
Recognition is about a new form of dialogue with these producers and a new form 
of legitimation for policy makers – a new form of governance. 
 
The sector is highly educated – in the UK over 70% of those with cultural 
occupations having some form of higher education. But only 1 in 5 of these, and 
only 1 in 10 employed in any capacity in the cultural industries, has a degree in a 
creative arts subject. Higher education is thus crucial in learning how to operate in 
this field, but not necessarily through the acquisition of ‘artistic’ or ‘creative 
skills’. Higher and Further education in general need to radically rethink their 
relationship to this sector. A non-linear learning framework, with multiple entry 
and exit routes; incubation units; flexible, small scale R&D schemes; the freeing 
up of expert knowledge – all these point to a new relationship between the 
university (itself involved in global and local expertise) and the cultural industries 
sector at the local level. Arts education in particular has to think through its 
defensive dismissal of ‘training’ in favour of ‘education’ and come to terms with a 
much more fluid interaction between artistic experimentation and entrepreneurial 
innovation.  
 
The cultural or ‘critical infrastructure’ of institutions, spaces, formal and informal 
networks, expertise, agencies and traditions – that which gives a locality the 
‘cultural competence’ to deal in a new global economy – needs become a central 
axis of economic, urban and social policy. This notion is too large to be discussed 
in any detail here but I would point to two important elements. Firstly, the 
traditional arts have a crucial role to play; at present they have been defensive and 
unable to say how they can contribute to the cultural industries. The ways in 
which the arts feed into the wider cultural infrastructure – and not that necessarily 
of the official arts infrastructure – is hardly addressed at present; but its cultural 
circuits can be extremely catalytic for local creativity and innovation in both 
cultural production and consumption. The relationship of the arts to the cultural 
industries thus need a work of clarification; without this I suggest they will 
become a special interest group only. Secondly, as I have tried to suggest, cultural 
consumption and cultural production have close links, especially at local level. 
The possibilities of distinct and innovative consumption cultures has consistently 
been overlooked by cultural policy, as by urban regeneration. In fact, it is out of 
distinct local consumption cultures that innovative local production emerges. 
Rather than cultural policy promoting arts consumption (usually from outside the 
locality) as an antidote to mass cultural industry consumption, they may do well to 
look at the possibilities of promoting diversity and innovation in the spaces and 
practices associated with this consumption (such as building in low rent retail into 
schemes rather than seeing these as the economic generator for the rest of the 
building).  
 
Business support infrastructures, including training, information and advice, needs 
to be targeted and tailored to the needs of this sector. At present the languages of 
business support and cultural businesses are mutually incomprehensible. City 
marketing and inward investment agencies need to improve knowledge of and 
contact with the sector in order both to service its needs and to use it in its own 
operations. Thus on the one hand cultural businesses can have a global profile but 
be completely ignored in city marketing campaigns, or used in an exploitative and 
crass manner (usually after the moment has passed). On the other hand, cultural 
businesses could really benefit from the contact and expertise of these agencies in 
opening up more global contacts. They also need expertise on how to deal with 
the increased orders and organisational demands consequent upon access to larger 
markets. 
 
 
New information and communications technology is crucial in four ways. Firstly, 
it is through new content production that the new media industry has been forged, 
linking creative to (fairly basic) technology skills. The picture is fluid at present, 
not only involving the design of content but also new ways of manipulating 
information and design content to produce more information and more content 
that is perfectly homologous with the function of the informational mode of 
production as a whole. Secondly, these new technologies are opening up the 
possibilities of new global markets through internet based e-commerce in a way 
unthinkable even a few years ago. How this will change the articulation of large/ 
small, local/ global in industries such as music recording are difficult to predict. 
Thirdly, the internet allows the circulation of sector and sub-sector specific 
information in a more efficient manner than existing face to face and paper based 
forms. Given the growth of city led support and information services aimed at the 
sector technological literacy and access will be crucial to their full efficiency. 
Fourthly, in a similar way, new technologies provide ways of enhancing local 
connections and networks. Localised web sites, mail bases, bulletin boards can 
enhance local networks as well as provide a more collective identity and branding. 
These are happening very informally – but there are experiments at developing 
these at city and city quarter level. Fifthly, information technology point us 
towards the possibility of creating links to the wider economy. In areas such as 
fashion or furniture design, the possibilities of linking a dispersed and fragmented 
production (in the sense of original design) sector and a corporate purchase/ 
reproduction sector through sophisticated information and communication 
networks hold out enormous potential. 
 
Investment in technology literacy and technology access is thus absolutely crucial 
in the promotion of a local cultural industries sector. 
 
 
Urban regeneration; the relationship between the cultural infrastructure 
(‘software’) and the urban infrastructure (‘hardware’) takes us well beyond the 
limits of this article. But the relationships are both complex and manifold. 
Cultural industries thrive in the city; cities sustain the networks of information, 
expertise and interaction central to their operations. The sector both contributes to 
and is attracted by the symbolic value of the built environment – as Zukin 
(critically) makes clear. Cultural infrastructures as much as any other allow the 
city to flexible respond to changes within the global space of flows. On the other 
hand, the multiple value added brought by the cultural industries has almost 
universally been reduced by developers to their (positive) impact on land values 
(Zukin again). The inability of planners to place value on such activities in terms 
of intellectual and cultural capital has meant that cultural industries have usually 
been the first victims of the regeneration they helped to inspire. The integration of 
intellectual and cultural capital within the urban ‘asset base’ will be a central 
question for planners in the next decade (just as many companies are having do 
deal with the fact that most of its assets are intellectual). 
 
Finally, in the UK the cultural industries were caught up in the polemic between 
those who see the economic future as service sector led and those who saw it as 
manufacturing led. This was of course a highly politicised debate in the 1980s, 
whereby Margaret Thatcher saw the modernisation process in terms of breaking 
the power of the unions – and ‘manufacture’ became a dirty word along with the 
unions and a particular articulation of ‘labourist’ culture . This attack on unions-
manufacture also had a regional dimension in that they were concentrated in the 
Labour heartlands of the North and ‘Celtic fringe’ – this specific cultural 
distinction acting as a political determinant in their subsequent treatment by 
central government. The opposition of service and manufacture is, as we now 
know, largely a false one – the key term is the productive capacity of knowledge 
and information within each. The cultural industries were promoted in many de-
industrialised cities, as symbolic of a new future if economically negligible. They 
were equally decried as yuppie jobs, cosmetic, irrelevant. I would conclude by 
arguing that, rather than opposing the old and the new, in the next decade the task 
of local and regional strategy will be to find ways of linking the cultural industries 
to the wider manufacturing sector; pointing to creativity, risk, innovation and the 
central role of information, knowledge and culture in the global economy.  
 
 
 
